THAT men do .frequently act unselfishly is, of course, a fad. But what motivates them to such altruistic behaviour is still an unsettled question. Can it be said that among the original springs of human action there is one which dn occasion impels the individual to seek the good of his fellows rather than his own private interest? Or is altruistic action motivated by enlightened prudence-meaning in this case the self-preservative and egoistic drives, modified by an understanding of the mutuality of all individual human interests? This question, always important for an unders,tanding of 'human nature, has taken on a new urgency 'in our day. The history of Soviet Russia has demonstrated what can be achieved in time of peace by -the co-ope.~ative effort of all the me~bers of a great modern nation .. The atomic bomb has given warning to mankind that the nations . of the world must learn' to co-operate in order to escape destruction. Thus no one can question today the imperative, even .desperate, need for more thorough-going and effective co-operation in both the national and the international fields. The only remaining doubt concerns the reladon of such complete and far-reaching co.,..operation to the freedom of human individuals .. The Western democracies believe that individual citizens can be induced to co-operate voluntarily in· the pursuit of common national goals, and that ·a world government can likewise be based upon a willing . co-operation between nations. Totalitarian regimes undertake tb make such co-operation compulsory. They proceed on .the assumption that the degree of co-operation requisite to conserve human welfare can be obtained from a citizen-body only if it is enforced by governmental machinery and the ~rganization of social life. Of these two political doctrines, that one is probably destined to prevail which is most in harmony with the nature and constitution of man. The answer to the problem of which doctrine fits human nature best depends very largely upon the facts of human motivation. Is there an original altruistic motive operating in kindly and helpful, in patriotic, public-spirited, humanitarian action, or does all such · altruistic behaviour spring from the basic self-preservative drives directec.l by prudential intelligence? This problem of the nature of altruistic motivation is by no means a · new one. It has been discussed. and debated at great length by the philosophers and moralists of the past. 2 At present, ·anyone who wishes to 1 The substance of this paper was read a.t the 1946 meeting of the Canadian Psychological Association at Queen's University, May 15-17. · 2 This is particularly true of English moral philosophy. During the two centuries beginning with Ho_bbes in the seventeenth, and continuing to J~ S. Mill in the nineteenth,· the principal alternative views on altruistic motivation were defined, and many of their social and moral implications made dear. Hobbes held that all human impulses are ego-157
1 The substance of this paper was read a.t the 1946 meeting of the Canadian Psychological Association at Queen's University, May 15-17. · 2 This is particularly true of English moral philosophy. During the two centuries beginning with Ho_bbes in the seventeenth, and continuing to J~ S. Mill in the nineteenth,· the principal alternative views on altruistic motivation were defined, and many of their social and moral implications made dear. Hobbes held that all human impulses are ego-know the real facts and find out what conclusions they warrant turns naturally and hopefully to scientific psychology. It must be admitted at the start that present-day psychology gives no clear and simple answer to the question of what motivates human beings to act unselfishly. This ]s not becaus' e psychologists of our day in attacking such a problem are content ·to express and defend on speculative grounds their own individual opinions> thus continuing the controversies of the past. It is rather because empirical and experimental studies in this field of psychologic~ research have brought to light a great vari~ty of facts relating to this mode 'of behaviour, and because these fa·cts, while pertinent and evidential, are not easy to interpret and often appear to point in different, even opposite, directions. In dealing with this problem, as with many other problems of human behaviour, the psychologist of today is not handicapped by paucity of factual information: he is em barr~ssed by the amount and complexity of it. When, however, we review the results of psychological studies in this field, consider what they imply in the· way of general conclusions regarding different aspects of aitruistic behaviour, and then seek to correlate these partial interpretations, there emerges a total view of the dynamics of is tic · or self-regarding, motivated by the striving of the individual to obtain t1le asure and avoid pain. .f\pparently unselfish motives, according. to Hobbes, spring from the pleasurepain expectations of the agent, suppor. ted by the rational organization of the state to set limits to human selnshness. The scope of such hedonistic calculus was later extended by Paley to include divinely ordained rewards and punishments in the world to come. In the meantime~ moralists holding this view saw the need for some other psychological factor · to account· for the hedonistic appeal of altruistic modes of behaviour. This they found in the "law of association of ideas," identical in principle with the "law of conditioning" in contemporary psychology. This principle, discovered by Aristotle, was first applied to 'altruistic behaviour by Gay, and systematically formulated by Hartley. If, to use the familiar example, a piece of metal is associated with exchange value, it becomes, as money, a direct so~rce of satisfaction. So modes of action associated with the rewards and penalties affixed by social authority become themselves invested with pleasure or pain expectations. The theory that human motivation is always egoistic and hedonistic culminated in the utilitarianism of Bentham, who held that the only interest man is adequately motivated to · consult is his own, which consists in increasing the sum-total of his pleasures. Bentham made full use of the principle of association, and dealt with both the psychological and the political factors which affect the prudential pleasure calculus. The opposite view-that there is a primary altruistic motive of love, pity, or sympathy, inherent in human naturehad also its able exponents. Shaftesbury was the first to attribute cardinal importance to natural affections springing from love, goodwill, and sympathy, which as emotional impulses prompted men to social duty. Hutcheson further stressed the complete dis-. interestedness of benevolent motivation. Both Burne and Adam Smith acknowledged fellow-feeling or sympathy as an original principle in human nature. Butler agreed with Shaftesbury that there is an altruistic or benevolent impulse in human nature, while he added, as· a distinctive characteristic · of man, the power. of rational reflection which in the two forms of conscience and reasonable self-love regulates and adjusts the social and the self-regarding motives. J~ S. Mill accepted the egoistic hedonism of Bentham and the utilitarian school but, .at some expense to logical consistency, held that the rationa1 dignity of man leads him to prefer the .higher intellectual pleasures to the lower, and that, since each man desires his own happiness, it follows .that the general happiness is desired by all. altruistic motivation which is, I believe, substantially true to the facts of human nature and conduct.
The psychologist may observe any form of behaviour as he-finds it in the case of particular individuals whose responses he studies intensively and biographically, endeavouring in this way to relate the actions, habits, and· .dispositions which he finds in his subjects now to the events and experiences of their previous life-histories, back to childhood and infancy. This method, called ((clinical," was introduced by Freud, adopted by his followers, and is exclusively relied on by psychoanalysts. It is also widely employed by psychologists generally, who ·agree in regarding it as one of the two scientifically valid_ methods for· the investigat1on of human nature and conduct. The clinical method has been found particularly helpful in the study of behaviour disturbances and personality disorders which usually have their source in a conflict of motives that has arisen in the previous life of the patient. . Because clinical study 1s thus well·suited to throw light upon the inner, persistent springs of human action, some leading psychologists regard it as-our principal source of information regarding human motives and motivation. One of these, A. H. Maslow,· has reached definite conclusions concerning altruistic motivation. Among the basic motivating needs of mankind, he asserts, are love needs. These are, he believes, next in strength and efficacy to physiological and safety needs. Love needs, as he cpnceives th~m, are not identical with sex needs or with maternal needs. They are broader, and include the need to give and ·to receive warm affection. --The evidence on which he relies is the fact, in his opinion well established hy clinical observation, that in our society the thwarting of-love needs is the most commonly found core in cases of maladjustment and of severe psychopathology. It is wo-rthy of passing mention that love in this sense of personal affecti01i plays a more important part in the Freudian psychology than is generally supposed. Freud affirms that such tender emotion (which of course differs from love in the primary Freudian sense of libido or sexual .energy) is responsible for friendly, helpful behaviour on the part of groupmembers, and, as evoked by parents, teachers, and the like, makes children amenable to education ..in the (Clatency" period between infancy and adolescence .
. Experimental studies of altruistic behaviour, particularly in children, have brought to light other facts which may appear to. point toward a--different conclusion. Objective studies of behaviour by the experimental method, which some psychologists regard as superior to the clinical, have convinced them that -habits of helpful, other-regarding behaviour are acquired by human beings in childhood just as all other socially adaptive habits are acquired-through the experimentally attested modes o"flearning;_-such as trial and error, conditioning, effect, etc. To be sure, the child must 160 THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO QUARTE~LY be motivated in order to. learn, by whatever method. But the motives operative in learning altruistic modes of action are no different, these psychologists find, from those which impel him to acquire other adaptive . habits. They are mainly the security and safety drives, i.e., the desire for the bodily necessities and comforts in the way of food, clothing, shelter, and care which only parents, family-members, and the adult world-generally_ can supply, and the urge to escape the pain of pu,nishment and other penalties consequent upon adult disfavour. 4 Further light has been thrown upon the· way in which human beings acquire altruistic modes of acti~g and thinking by the recent researches of social psychologists in the field of cultural anthropology. Detailed studies of the social culture of primitive human groups have shown that the socializing of the human individual is not limited to the acquisition of specific habits of helpful, co-operative behaviour but includes, along with these, the understanding and adoption by him of socially accepted , standards, beliefs, attitudes, and points of view which approve and enjoin , such altruistic conduct. In thus introcepting in early life the norms and rules of behaviour . prescribed by the social· tradition of his people, the group-member is motivated, these writers point out, not merely . by the self-preservative drives but also by self-esteem, the desire for favourable recognition by his fellows, for social standing and good reputation. The cultural pattern of every human group car~ies with it~ they shawl an ideal · of what is excellent and admirable · in individual character and conduct. By this socially accepted ideal all group-members, except a few "deviants,''
4 Floyd H. Allport in his influential Social Psychology (Houghton Mifflin, 1924) offered an explanation of the psychological -antecedents .of social behaviour which has since been followed by the majority of American psychologists. Allport maintained that: (1) At the outset social stimuli are in no way different from non-social. (2) Since in infancy the safety and well-being of the human individual depend upon the ministrations of others, these social stimuli must acquire through conditioning a distinctive and pervasive significance (p. 76). (3) Appropriate reactions to such social stimuli have also to be differentiated by the learning proces-s (p. 78). (4) It is only such subsequently learned adaptive habits that may be properly termed social (p. 76). · P. T. Young, .who in his important work The Motivation of Behavior (Wiley, 1936) adopts ~he experimental approach to this problem, states agreement with Allport that the significance of social behaviour is exactly the same 'as non-social, viz., the" · biological adaptation of the individual to his environment (p. 145).
Young holds that all the primary human drives, such as hunger, thirst, sex., and similar organ_ ic urges, have specific bodily mechanisms, and operate to ·restore phJ•siological equilibrium (p. 136). He further believes that there are other secondary drives built up throughsocial influences, which enable man's biological appetites "to find satisfaction through association and co-operation with others (p. 428), the leading example being the "prestige" . motive whose biological utility is clear, since social success is an aspect of biological success (p. 395\ Many other American' tex.t-books of psychology uphold the theory that social, including altruistic, motives eJcist not in their own right but because they contribute to the · ~atisfaction of biological needs, e.g.", J. estimate their own \vorth, and hence are impelled by the powerful motive of self-esteem to conform to its dictates.
.
Thus we see that experimental investigation of the acquisition of socially adapti~e habits by children, supplemented by scientific study of · . the moulding of individual personality by social norms and c~lture-products, furnishes little evidence that the la.ve impulse is an important factor in the motivation of altruistic behaviour. Many psychiatrists have been convin-ced bv their own clinical observations that the content of social morality consists ~holly of conventionally approved rules of behaviour upheld by the group tradition, which are obeyed by individua1s because they fear the penalties which society will inflict and the guilt they will themselves feel if they disobey them. To be sure, these psychiatrists mostly. follow Freud in believing that our social conscience is a legacy from our parents, a product of emotional attachment to them in infancy. In this way Freud assigned to the love motive (in the primary Freudian sense ·of libido) a necessary· function in the genesis of altruistic behaviour-but only in th~ first beginnings of the human life-history. Later on it is, according-to Freud, the "reality principle," i.e., the intelligent an~icipation of the painful consequences of uninhibited self-indulgence, which leads the indi..: vidual to conform to the dictates of social custom. On.ce the usuper-ego, or social conscience is acquired in infancy through emotional identification with parents, its stereotyped rules of social duty retain their authority undiminished and unmodified by the experiences of later life.
To hold this latter view that socially approved modes of altruistic; behaviour owe their influence and authority over the individual wholly to the teaching and example of parents in infancy and the sanctions imposed by society to enforce them is to neglect quite inexcusably the facts discovered by the Swiss psychologist Piaget. 6 Piaget devoted years to a carefully planned and well controlled investigation of children's behaviour, both in game-playing and the social relations of everyday life. He found that in playing marbles, a favourite amusement, the little boys of five and six regarded the rules of the game as decrees of some external, superior authority, that .of the older boys or their fathers, or even their grandfathers, and, as such,_ to be unquestionably obeyed (except in the rare cases, perhaps, where a violation would go unnoticed). But he found that as these boys grew older they gained an increasing insight into the purpose and sqcial utility of the rules, so that by the age of ten or eleven they willingly accepted and followed the_ rules as the understood conditions of there be-_ ing any game at all between equal par-ticipants. In the case of the so-called moral virtues like truth-telling and justice and generosity, he observed a similar progress in the children. \Vhen questioned,_ the younger boys said that 'lying was wrong because parents and teachers had pronounced it wicked and would punish them for it, while the older boys had gained some in~ight into the social relations involved and the fact that unless truth--telJing were general people could not get ~long peaceably, could not work or play together. The discoveries of Piaget regarding the influence of developing intelligence upon the moral judgments and social standards of children may weH seem to round out a tenable explanation of altruistic behavi.our in terms of motivation that is, broadly -speaking, egoistic. Granted the needs for food and shelter, .-to escape pain and injury, and to have self-esteem and social recognition, operative in the experiences of family life and the social world,_ then developing intelligence can to some extent be counted on to make ·clear to the individual that altruistic, co-operative modes of behaviour pay, in terms of true self-itlterest and lasting satisfaction. Lest, however, we be led by these considerations to conclude that the love impulse plays no. essential part in the motivation of altruistic behaviour generally. speaking, it is necessary to remind ourselves of another incontrovertible fact. The importance of this fact has been fully demonstrated by psychological studies. of the causes of delinquent and neuroti-c behaviour in childhood and youth. It . is that there is little likelihood of a child's gaining an insight into the personal"advantages of altruistic behaviour unless he has the chance actually to experience the benefits of ce-operation with others in work and in play. But he will scarcely have gained such indjspensable experience if he has never felt much or any liking for others, for companionship with them, or for taking a hand in their games or tasks. Consequently, in cases where the springs of human affection have been dried up through parental n. eglect or harshness/ or the absence of educational opportunity or facilities for social recreation, it is improbable that the unfortunate individual will listen -to, or be much moved by, anything his reason may tell him as to the . real advantages to be gained from exchange of helpful services with others.
Psychological investigation of the dynamics of altruistic behaviour as seen in the lifetime and social adjustments of human individuals shows it to have, we now see,. a complex and changing motivation. The love impulse in the little child undoubtedly impels him to .try · to help, and so to please, those for whom he feels ·a warm affection. In learni~g to take account of the wishes a· nd comfort of others in his early training for social-life, the child is motivated chiefly by the basic security drives. With the growth of consciousness of self, the desire for favourable . recognition by others pl~ys a leading part in promptlng the youthful member to adopt those . modes of. altruistic conduct which are approved and sanctioned by the culture of his social group. Increased underst~nding of his relations to his fellows in society, .and of the interdependence of his activities and interests with · theirs, is also an important factor in redirecting the individual,s ego1stic motives upon socialized and co-operative goals. And throughout, the motive of love or liking for others exerts a very real, if often indirect, force impelling the individual to associate with them in play and in work , and thus to gain the experience of social give· and take which is necessary if his intelligence is to assist him in making a satisfactory social adjustment.
We have now to apply these conclusions to the larger world of organi~ed social life and to. consider what motives impel men to unselfish, publicspirited action in the civic, national, and int~rnational fields. This question, though primarily a psychological one, has momentous social and human importance today. The future of democracy, now in the balance, will be determi-ned to a very great extent by the capacity of men for voluntary cooperation, both as fellow-citizens in the national state and as members of the international community. The capacity of human beings for such far-: reaching and effective co-operation as democracy proposes 'is dependent upon the strength and--scope of the altruistic motives in the nature of man.
It is consequently not surprising that thoughtful people, deeply concerned for the· future of civilization and the human race, should be looking for sci~nti:fi.c information about those altruistic motive~ in human nature which · can be relied on to impel individuals to act co-operatively, generously, humanely.
In view of the complex and varied nature of altruistic motivation, it is. not strange that psychologists, on the basis of the evidence, should fail to agree ·as . to which one of the many driv. es that play a part in altru,istic motivation is chiefly operative in the field of large-scale social interaction. Some leading psychologists believe that men are, and always wiU be, impelled to ' co-operate industrially and pol. itically, nationally and internationally, by an expansion of the goal-objects of the motives of selfpreservation and self-esteem to include the several groups of which the agent is member. This expansio· n of the scope of self-interest takes place, they hold, through an understanding of the interdependence of all individual interests. vVe .find this view well illustrated in an article by Professor D. · K. Adams, 8 who takes his text from Piaget's well-known studies, mentioned above, of boys' behaviour in their ma~ble games. Professor Adams does not believe that there is any non-egoistic motive strong enough to induce the individual citizen to put the common or national good before his own private good. But he does believe it possible fo1· the individual citizen, to gain an insight into the identity of his own interests with those of . society. In his ·opinion the prevalence of such insight, enlisting egoistic motives in support of the social good, is what ex. plains the willing COoperation between citizens of a free democracy in pursuit of a common I ' national goal. · An important factor in evoking such an insight is, he .thinks, the general frustration which results from unenlightened self-seeking.
'
. .
Other well-known psychologists believe that the love impulse, along with the sympathetic appreciation and accord that it engenders, is the dominant force which impels the individual citizen to put the common good before his private interest. One of.these is E. C. Tolman whose social · psychology is patterned very largely on the Freudian model. 9 Also using the word "identity," but in a different sense, Professor Tolman sees in the "general Freudian notion of identification" the psychological basis for cO-operation, not merely in the nation-state but in the international community. The identification which Tolman has in mind, however, has ·its basis not in the intellect but in impulse and emotion. It is, he says, the identification of the individual with some whole group which he wants to · love and be loved by. In so far as the individual does thus identify hi~self with such a group, he tends to feel at home with it; he feels its goals to be his goals, its fortune to be his fortune, and its prestige to be his prestige.
Most·psychologists to.day would agree that identification as understood by Freud and emphasized by Tolman does frequently occur, but they are · inclined to think of it as an abnormal symptom, a compensatory or defensive . device, rather than as a controlling factor in normal social organization. Under . the stress of intoler~ble frustration or d~eply injured seff-esteem, people do gain relief and substitute-satisfaction by identifying themselves · with outstanding figures or militant groups in the contemporary social world, or . with heroes of the stage, screen, or novel. But the Freudian concept has social and politi,cal applications more extensive than this which merit serious consideration. Freud held that the individual identifies himself with fellow group-members because they all share with him a common Jove for the same leader who st~nds in the position of kind elder brother and father surrogate. This comm,on tender tie, he says, is what prevails over the hostile impulses of group-mem hers, and prompts them to deeds of friendly service. Certainly, love for, and loyalty to, the person of the sovereign or monarch has played too large a part in impelling fellow-' subjects to co-operate in the national interest to permit us to dismiss the Freudian theory as extravagant or fantastic . . Loyalty to king and country, as the dominant form of patriotic motivation, 'historically speaking, would se~m to have psychological sources very like those pointed out by Freud. His theory also throws light upon the psychological factors operative in the rise of contemporary dictators and dictatorships. To be sure, devotion to the common l'eader which identifies the fai-thful is not a visible mark which distinguishes a comrade, a spiritual brother, a fellow-traveller, from the common run of people in a national population. We see the consequent · udlity of coloured shirts, salutes, handgrips, and oth~r symbols of partisan Between these two views of altruistic motivation, the .one hinging upon increased insight and understanding and the other upon love originally aroused .in the family situation, G. W. Allport mediates with. the concepts of ego-involvement and participation.l 0 He consid~rs the human ind:ividual's desire for recognized social position, for status in the community, insatiable. When, however, a man's social pursuits realistically engage his ego and fulfil its status-seeking· motives, he -becomes, Professor Allport would say, a true participant in co-operative activity. When· individuals thus become participants or team-mates in the performance of social tasks, the motivating tensions of the one are relieved by the work and success of another. "Your tensions can be relieved by my work, and my tensions by your work, provided we are participants." 11 Now it seems clear that this _ can happen only when there is such an identification of feeling and purpose between participants as Tolman and the Freudians have in mind. Certainly we cannot obtain the full measure of personal satisfaction from the achievements of others unle~s there is a community of experience and emotion between ourselves and them which ca~ses us to feel their triumphs and failures, their "dangers and escapes, as our own. It is the merit of the Freudian theory to have seen this and to have recognized the further highly important fact that such emotional identification carries with it, and is reinforced by, friendly feeling, comradely love. . . We are driven to conclude, therefore, that if the average citizen is to be impelled to co-operate with others in the pursuit of an inclusive social good, he must do more than perceive the identity of his own interest with the welfare of his fellows· . It is doubtful if such merely intellectual assent would suffice to redirect his egoistic motives very effectually upon the social goal. He .must go further than this·, and merge his feeling and interest with others in a sh. ared loyalty to a. common objective or goal. It appears then that the Freudian concept of identification is · sound in at-. tributing altruistic motivation in the social group mainly to a shared loyalty to a common external object which creates emotional ties of comradely affection between participant members. \iVhen we apply this principle to politicaL and industrial co-operation in a democracy, a question at once arises concerning the external object of the love and loyalty which is to be the motivating agency. One thinks at once of per~onalleaders and leadership. When we remember the part played by leaders like Churchill and Roosevelt in evoking the maximum . co-operative war effort from their respective nations, and the need of capable, dominating leadership in all military operations, we cannot fail to be impressed by the power of such leadership. But political leadership in a free democracy is insecure and generally short-lived, at -the mercy as it is of changing winds of popular favour and disfavour, and all the ups and downs in the game of party politics. Furthermore, men thrown into . positions of highest authority by our election machinery often lack those magnetic qualities which evoke admiration, loyalty, and love from the mass of the people. Hence the conclusion seems inescapable that the external object which must be principally relied upon in a democracy to arouse that allegiance and devotion in a citizen-body, which identifies its members' as co-participants in a common task, can be nothing more, or_less, than the agreed-upon goals of national endeavour. Now it must be admitted, however reluctantly, that national goals as compare'd with personal leaders, are ineffective evokers of enthusiastic loyalty, of whole-hearted devotion. They are generalized and abstract, not concretely individual; they exist largely as ideas in men's minds, not as :flesh and blood actualities. Furthermore, national goals are somewhat vaguely conceived, even by the enlightened and articulate. It is often hard to make them definite and intelligible even to oneself, still more so to others, and consequently allegiance to them is not readily or adequately expressed. The result is that this kind of loyalty does not in most cases manifest itself openly, and when it does exist is not easily detected and appreciated-· certainly not as easily · as devo. tion to a personal leader. Hence it does not act very effectively as an identifying factor, joining together in a com-. munity of emotion and participant endeavour many people of diverse cultural backgrounds, occupations, tastes, and ambitj_ons.
These facts all conspire to raise a question of gravest moment for the future of democracy. How are fellow-citizens to discover in each other this basic loyalty to national goals which, when consciously shared, will evo,ke from them the we-feeling of comradeship in a co-operative enterprise? o · ne thing at least may be said, though it suggests no easy answer to the question:
There is only one way in which it can be dorie, and this is b)• direct personal contact and communication. This is of course no new idea. Allport, in the article above-mentioned, refers to the emphasis which Dewey and Follett have placed in their writings upon primary face-to-face association as the underlying, basic condition of voluntary co-operation in industry" and the state. Personal communication .is not limited, as many seem t.o think, ·to the exchange of ideas and opinions through the medium of talk.
It operates through the media' of outward action and emotional expression as well as language. We perceive from the actions of others what they are trying to do, what their purposes are, and how they· go about realizing them. We perceive-from the facial expressions of others, gestures, etc., ·what their feelings are and, in many cases at least, what circumstances have aroused them. Personal communication is thus a complex and many-sided activity through which beliefs an.d opinions, feelings of like or dislike, and goals of action along with the means employed to attain them, are conveyed and oftentimes shared. Hence it accomplishes far more than the written or · printed message ever can. If given a chance, such direct personal interchange cannot fail to reveal something of the total personality of each communicant, and give some telling indication of his permanent interests~ guiding convictions, and controlling loyalties. Only ~hrough such _ communication can individuals as different _in upbringing, tastes, and ambitions as those which comprise the populati_ on of a great modern nation become aware of the beliefs, goals, attitudes, and sentiments which they share in common. And such degree of mutual understanding, with the sympathetic appreciation of common interests and loyalt_ ies which it induces, appears to be the only substitute in a free democracy for that shared devotion to a personal leader which identifies group-members emotionally and motivates them to mutually helpful behaviour-.
Growing awareness of the importance of personal communication is evidenced by investigators in the field of industrial psychology. In hiswrit-ings on industrial management, F. J. Roethlisberger holds it to be a prime condition of better co-operation in large-scale industry that channels of communication shall be opened between management and the mass of the workers, so that friendly,' companionable relations shall be encouraged all along the line. 12 Real, unimpeded communication does _not now occur, he points out. Management and workers not merely differ in outlook and attitude, they talk a different language. Hence such messages as are transmitted -up and down the line do not, in most cases, convey the meaning intended .. What is needed is dire.ct personal contact, and, to bring this about, nothing can take the place of the personal intervjew. He therefore con tends that, if industry is to become more genuinely co-operative, adequate and ample provision must be made for interviews between representatives of the workers and the managerial staff. In the conduct of such interviews, he believes -that the rules formulated for industrial interviewing by the celebrated Hawthorne investigators should be followed. The gist of these rules is -that such interviewing will be successful in proportion as each participant refrains from trying to instruct, admonish, or exhort, and is able to penetrate the . screen of defensive attitudes ahd face--saving devices whi~h the-other has thrown up, and to discover his deeper personal beliefs, convictions, and purposes. In short, two persons, two selves, come 1 in this way to confront one another and become personally acquainted.
Recent studies of counselling techniques as employecl·jn psychotherapy, like those of Professor Carl R. Rogers,1 8 give added testimony to the importance of personal communication as the prime condition of the establishment of co-operative relations between human beings. The full and free expression of hostile impulses and negative emotions by the subject gives them social objectivity and fur~ishes the needed common ground in 12 F. J. Roethlisberger, Management and Morale (Harvard University Press, 1942) .
objectiv~ fact for a joint exploration of the subject's problem. Once. this is done, the subject is freed from the grip of his defence mechanisms which have had the effect of linking him not with the real community but with a pseudo-c~mmunity of his own egocentric imagination. The way. is opened for ce-operative thinking on the part of the .subject and the counsellor, involving a progressive insight into the formerts situation. The attainment of such joint insight is accompanied by are-arousal of social interests· and altruistic impulses in the subject, and makes him ready for new courses of action which bring him into mutually helpful and satisfying relations with his family and occupational associates.
The testing and training of men drafted for military service has brought to public notice a disconcerting amount of emotional instability and nervous disorder in our population. What a psychologist, Dr. N. 0. Cameron, has written about paranoia holds true to a large extent . of all ~euroses. 14 Paranoia he describes as a disorder of communication, that conjo1nt activity . by which two or more persons share the same object 'or act in its meaningful context. Paranoiac attitudes and actions, he says, grow out of a breakdown in the machinery of social co-operation. The mutual sharing of plans, acts, and consequences that goes to make up genuine communication gets replaced in certain persons by a species of solitary behaviour governed by a biased interpretation of the facts of daily. life on the basis of their own preoccupations and grievances. Surely we have here more than· a hint of one patent cause of the lack of the will to ca-operate in a social culture like our own where competition is pervasive and incessant, and social contacts are, to a great and growing extent, mechanically intermediated, reactive, and impersonal.
